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Whenever we analyze a strategic situation as a game, we face the issue of the existence of a
Nash equilibrium, especially a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for economic applications. In
the literature, several su￿cient conditions for existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
have been provided.3 Among such conditions, those in terms of "strategic complementar-
ities" by Topkis (1973) and Vives (1990) and those in terms of "potential functions" by
Rosenthal (1973) and Monderer and Shapley (1996), can be applied even if action sets are
￿nite.4 This note investigates the relationship between these two conditions.
A game of strategic complementarities is a game in which if the competitors turn more
aggressive, the agent’s optimal reaction is to become more aggressive as well. Many eco-
nomic models belong to this class of games. 5 The weakest version of such strategic com-
plementarities is the weak strategic complementarities discussed in Dubey et al. (2006).
Games of weak strategic complementarities are those in which, for each player i, there
exists a selection within i’s best response correspondence which is non-decreasing in the
other players’ action.
On the other hand, several versions of potential functions also have been proposed
since Monderer and Shapley (1996). 6 These potential functions have a common feature: a
potential function is a real-valued function over the set of action pro￿les of a game, and every
maximizer of a potential function is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the games. That
is, in games with a potential function, known as a potential game, the problem of ￿nding a
Nash equilibrium is a simple maximization problem rather than a ￿xed point problem. This
implies that every potential game possesses a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if action sets
are ￿nite. The weakest version of such potential functions is the nested pseudo-potential
function introduced in Uno (2007a).
3For example, see Debreu (1952), Glicksberg (1952), Nikaido and Isoda (1955), Dasgupta and Maskin
(1986), Topkis (1979), Vives (1990), Rosenthal (1973), Monderer and Shapley (1996), Milchtaich (1996)
and so on.
4In fact, Topkis (1973) used the term of supermodular instead of strategic complementarities. Strategic
complementarities were originally used by Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985). Rosenthal (1973)
did not use the term of potential function, but essentially used the same concept as exact potential function
de￿ned by Monderer and Shapley (1996). Milchtaich (1996) provided a su￿cient condition in congestion
games with player speci￿c utilities, where action sets are ￿nite.
5See Topkis (1998), Vives (1999), and Amir (2005).
6For example, exact potentials, weighted potentials, ordinal potentials, generalized ordinal potentials
are introduced in Monderer and Shapley (1996); (ordinal) best response potentials in Voorneveld (2000);
pseudo-potentials in Dubey et al. (2006); best response potentials and better response potentials in Morris
and Ui (2004); generalized potentials, monotone potentials, and local potentials in Morris and Ui (2005);
iterated potentials in Oyama and Tercieux (2004); nested best response potentials in Uno (2007b) and so
on.
2The nested pseudo-potential functions generalize the pseudo-potential functions de￿ned
by Dubey et al. (2006). A pseudo-potential function of a game is a real-valued function f
over its set of action pro￿les such that any best-response of each player i if endowed with f
as payo￿ function is a best-response as well in the original game. As for the other versions
of potential functions, every maximizer of a pseudo-potential function of a game is a Nash
equilibrium of the game. It is as if the pseudo-potential functions are payo￿ functions of
one representative agent who chooses strategies for all players.
In considering a nested pseudo-potential function, we think of a representative agent for
a subset T of players instead of all of them: for each player i in T, given any strategy pro￿le
for other players, maximizing this representative agent’s payo￿ fT yields a best-response
for player i. Suppose that there is a partition T of players such that, for each member T
of T , there is such a representative agent whose payo￿ function is fT.7 Then the collection
of fT’s can be seen as a new complete information game, where each member T in T is
regarded as a single player. That is, the original game is reduced to a game with a smaller
number of players.
Notice that such reduction can be nested: the new game among step 1 representative
agents may be reduced to a game with an even smaller number of players, by considering
a step 2 representative agent for step 1 representative agents, and then a representative
agent of these, and so on. We say that a game has a nested pseudo-potential if a game
is reduced to a game with one representative agent through this process, where the payo￿
functions of representative agents are pseudo-potential functions.
In earlier literature, Dubey et al. (2006) showed that the set of pseudo-potential games
strictly includes the set of games of weak strategic complementarities if the action sets are
one-dimensional and each payo￿ function depends on her own action and the aggregator
of the other players’ actions, i.e., in the case of a game with an aggregator. Otherwise, a
game of weak strategic complementarities may not be a pseudo-potential game, as shown
in Example 6.1 below.
This note shows that the set of nested pseudo-potential games strictly includes the set
of games of weak strategic complementarities if the action sets are one-dimensional, except
possibly for one player, and ￿nite (Theorem 5.1). The above relationships are illustrated
in Figure 1. This result establish that the existence of nested pseudo-potential function
rather than weak strategic complementarities su￿ces to guarantee the existence of a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium as long as we consider games where each player’s action set is
one-dimensional and ￿nite.8
7This idea also has appeared as q-potential in Monderer (2007).
8Unfortunately, the proof of our result depends on Taraski’s ￿xed point theorem.
3Figure 1: Strategic complementarities and nested potential games when the action set of
each player is one-dimensional, except possibly for one player
Our result provides an answer to the question of which games are nested pseudo-
potential games that are not be pseudo-potential games. The answer is that, for example,
a game of weak strategic complementarities may not be a pseudo-potential game but still
be a nested pseudo-potential game by the result (Theorem 5.1).
2 Preliminaries
Let X be a ￿nite subset of the m-dimensional Euclidean space Rm. The inequality x ≥ y
means xi ≥ yi for each i, while x > y means x ≥ y and there exists i such that xi > yi.
For x,y ∈ X, let infX{x,y} denote the greatest lower bound for x and y in X, and let
supX{x,y} denote the least upper bound for x and y in X.
A set X in Rm is a lattice if X contains the least upper bound and the greatest lower
bound of each pair of its elements, i.e., for each x,y ∈ X, infX{x,y} ∈ X and supX{x,y} ∈
X.
Tarski (1955) showed that the collection of ￿xed points of a non-decreasing function
from a nonempty ￿nite lattice into itself is a nonempty lattice, and he gave the form of the
greatest ￿xed point and the least ￿xed point: 9
Theorem 2.1 (Tarski, 1955) Suppose that f is a non-decreasing function from a nonempty
￿nite lattice X to X. Then the set of ￿xed points of f in X is a nonempty lattice,
sup{x ∈ X|x ≤ f(x)} is the greatest ￿xed point, and inf{x ∈ X|x ≥ f(x)} is the least
￿xed point.
9In fact, Tarski (1955) provides the ￿xed point theorem for an non-decreasing function on a complete
lattice instead of a ￿nite lattice.
43 Strategic Complementarities
A strategic form game consists of a ￿nite player set N = {1,...,n}, an action set Ai for
i ∈ N, and the payo￿ function gi : A → R for i ∈ N, where A :=
∏
i∈N Ai. Since we ￿x
the set A of action pro￿les, we denote a strategic form game (N,(Ai)i∈N,(gi)i∈N) simply
by gN := (gi)i∈N. For notational convenience, we write a = (ai)i∈N ∈ A; for i ∈ N,
A−i =
∏
j̸=i Aj and a−i = (aj)j̸=i ∈ A−i; and for T ⊆ N, AT =
∏
i∈T Ai, aT = (ai)i∈T ∈ AT,
A−T =
∏
i∈N\T Ai, and a−T = (ai)i∈N\T ∈ A−T. For each T ⊆ N, for any a−T ∈ A−T, let
gN|a−T denote the game where the action pro￿le of players outside T is ￿xed to a−T.
Since Topkis (1979), various notions of strategic complementarities have been intro-
duced.10 Among them, the weakest notion is the game of weak strategic complemen-
tarities. A game has weak strategic complementarities if, for each player, there exists a
non-decreasing selection in the player’s best-response correspondence:
De￿nition 3.1 (Dubey et al., 2006) A game gN is a ￿nite game of weak strategic com-
plementarities if, for each i ∈ N, Ai ⊂ Rmi is a ￿nite lattice,11 where mi ∈ N, and there
exists a function bi : A−i → Ai such that
1. bi is i’s best-response selection: bi(a−i) ∈ argmaxai∈Ai gi(ai,a−i) for all a−i ∈ A−i,
and
2. bi is non-decreasing with a−i: bi(a−i) ≤ bi(a′
−i) whenever a−i < a′
−i.
4 Nested Potential Games
Let gN be a strategic form game. Beginning with Monderer and Shapley (1996), various
notions of potential games have been proposed. Among them, one of the weakest notions
is the nested pseudo-potential games introduced in Uno (2007a). To introduce the nested
pseudo-potential games, we introduce the pseudo-potential games proposed by Dubey et al.
(2006). A pseudo-potential of a game gN is a real valued function f on the set A of action
pro￿les such that, for each player i, i’s best-response against the other players’ actions a−i
in the alternative game where i’s payo￿ function is given by f is a best-response to a−i in
the original game gN as well:
10For example, the supermodular games introduced by Topkis (1979), the games of strategic comple-
mentarities introduced by Bulow et al. (1985), the quasi-supermodular game introduced by Milgrom and
Shannon, and so on.
11We can also consider a version of games with compact action sets. In the version, it is di￿cult to show
our main result hold, as we will discuss in Remark 6.4 later.
5De￿nition 4.1 (Dubey et al., 2006) A function f : A → R is a pseudo-potential of gN
if, for each i ∈ N,
arg max
ai∈Ai
f(ai,a−i) ⊆ arg max
ai∈Ai
gi(ai,a−i) (1)
for all a−i ∈ A−i. If gN has a pseudo-potential, gN is called a pseudo-potential game.12
We say that an action pro￿le a∗ is a pseudo-potential maximizer of gN if f(a∗) ≥ f(a)
for all a ∈ A. Dubey et al. (2006) showed that a pseudo-potential maximizer, if it exists,
is a Nash equilibrium of the underlying game:
Proposition 4.2 (Dubey et al., 2006) If gN is a pseudo-potential game with a pseudo-
potential maximizer a∗, then a∗ is a Nash equilibrium of gN.
As a consequence, whenever action sets are ￿nite, every pseudo-potential game has a
pure strategy Nash equilibrium, since there always exists a maximizer for a function whose
domain is ￿nite.
Corollary 4.3 (Dubey et al., 2006) Every pseudo-potential game with ￿nite action sets
has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
We shall extend Proposition 4.2 by introducing a weaker notion of potential where a
‘pseudo-potential’ is considered for each subset of players instead of the entire set. For a
partition T of N, we de￿ne the partition T pseudo-potentials as follows:
De￿nition 4.4 (Uno, 2007a) Let T be a partition of N. A partition T pseudo-potential
of gN is a tuple (T ,(AT)T∈T ,(fT)T∈T ), where, for each T ∈ T , fT : A → R satis￿es that,
for each i ∈ T,
arg max
ai∈Ai
fT(ai,a−i) ⊆ arg max
ai∈Ai
gi(ai,a−i)
for all a−i ∈ A−i.
We denote such a partition T pseudo-potential (T ,(AT)T∈T ,(fT)T∈T ) by fT := (fT)T∈T
since action sets (AT)T∈T can be derived from the partition T of N and the set A of action
12If the inclusion of (1) can be replaced by the equality, f is called an (ordinal) best-response potential,
which is introduced in Voorneveld (2000). The pseudo-potentials generalize thus the (ordinal) best-response
potentials. Morris and Ui (2004, 2005) also introduced alternative best-response potentials, which are
special classes of (ordinal) best-response potentials of Voorneveld (2000) and the pseudo-potentials in
Dubey et al. (2006). See Morris and Ui (2004) for more discussion of this notion. We can apply the
analogous arguments in this section to these best-response potentials of Morris and Ui (2004).
6pro￿les in the original game gN.13
Note that we can regard each T -pseudo-potential fT as a strategic form game, where T
is the player set; for each T ∈ T , AT is the action set of T; and for each T ∈ T , fT is the
payo￿ function of T. The idea of the nested pseudo-potential games is to construct such
games iteratively for a nested sequence of partitions:
De￿nition 4.5 (Uno, 2007a) A function f : A → R is a nested pseudo-potential of gN
if there exist a positive integer K and a sequence (fT k)K
k=1 = ((fk
T)T∈T k)K
k=1 such that
• {T k}K
k=1 is a nested sequence of N: {T k}K
k=1 is an increasingly coarser sequence of
partitions of N with T 1 = {{i}|i ∈ N} and T K = {N};
• fT 1 = (f1
T)T∈T 1 is the original game gN: for each i ∈ N, f1
{i}(a) = gi(a) for all a ∈ A;
• for each k = 2,3,...,K, fT k = (fk
T)T∈T k is a T k-pseudo-potential of fT k−1 =
(f
k−1
T )T∈T k−1, where fT k−1 is regarded as a strategic form game as above: for each
T k ∈ T k and each T k−1 ∈ T k−1 with T k−1 ⊆ T k,
arg max
aTk−1∈ATk−1
f
k
Tk(aTk−1,a−Tk−1) ⊆ arg max
aTk−1∈ATk−1
f
k−1
Tk−1(aTk−1,a−Tk−1)
for all a−Tk−1 ∈ A−Tk−1; and
• fT K = (fK
N ) is such that fK
N (a) = f(a) for all a ∈ A.
A game that admits a nested pseudo-potential is called a nested pseudo-potential game.
We say that an action pro￿le a∗ is a nested pseudo-potential maximizer of gN if f(a∗) ≥
f(a) for all a ∈ A.
The essential property shared by all existing versions of potential games is that maxi-
mizers of a potential function are Nash equilibria as in Proposition 4.2. The nested pseudo-
potential proposed here inherits this property. Indeed, Uno (2007a) showed that a nested
pseudo-potential maximizer, if it exists, is a Nash equilibrium of the underlying game:
Proposition 4.6 (Uno, 2007a) Let gN be a nested pseudo-potential games with a nested
pseudo-potential maximizer a∗. Then, a∗ is a Nash equilibrium of gN.
13The partition T pseudo-potential generalizes Monderer (2007)’s q-potential: a strategic form game gN
has a q-potential if and only if gN has a partition T -potential, where q refers to the number of elements in
T and the potentials in (fT)T∈T are meant to be the exact potentials in Monderer and Shapley (1996). If
gN is a q-potential game, then it has a partition T pseudo-potential such that the number of elements of
T is q. The converse is not true, since there is a pseudo-potential game without an exact potential.
7Proposition 4.6 implies the following corollary.
Corollary 4.7 (Uno, 2007a) Every nested potential game with ￿nite action sets pos-
sesses a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
5 Nested Potentials in Games of Strategic Complemen-
tarities
This section shows that games of weak strategic complementarities are nested pseudo-
potential games if the action set of each player is one-dimensional, except possibly for one
player.
Theorem 5.1 Let gN be a ￿nite game of weak strategic complementarities, where Ai ⊂
Rm, m ≥ 2, for at most one unique player i ∈ N, and Aj ⊂ R for any j ̸= i. Then gN is
a nested pseudo-potential game.
To prove the above theorem, we will use the following four facts.
Firstly, a game of weak strategic complementarities has a property that, for each subset
T of N, the Nash equilibria of the restriction gN|a−T of gN for any action a−T ∈ A−T of all
players outside T has a selection that is non-decreasing with respect to a−T:
Lemma 5.2 Let gN be a game of weak strategic complementarities. Let T be a subset of
N. For any a−T ∈ A−T, let gN|a−T be the restricted game by a−T. Then, there exists a
function eT : A−T → AT such that
1. eT is an equilibrium selection: eT(a−T) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of gN|a−T
for any a−T ∈ A−T; and
2. eT(a−T) is non-decreasing with a−T: eT(a−T) ≤ eT(a′
−T) whenever a−T < a′
−T.
This lemma resembles the result from monotone comparative statics establishing that
a function from a nonempty lattice into itself has a ￿xed point that is non-decreasing with
the parameter. The proof is also similar to that of the monotone comparative statics in
Milgrom and Roberts (1994) or Topkis (1998, p.41, Theorem 2.5.2).
Proof. See Appendix.
Secondly, in a pseudo-potential game, for each pure strategy Nash equilibrium, we can
￿nd a pseudo-potential such that the Nash equilibrium is the unique maximizer of the
pseudo-potential:
8Lemma 5.3 Let gN be a pseudo-potential game. If a∗ is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
of gN, then there exists a pseudo-potential f : A → R such that {a∗} = argmaxa∈A f(a).
Proof. See Appendix.
Thirdly, we have the following characterization of partition pseudo-potentials:
Lemma 5.4 (fT)T∈T is a partition T pseudo-potential of gN if and only if, for each mem-
ber T of T , for any action a−T ∈ A−T of all players outside T, fT(·,a−T) is a pseudo-
potential of the restricted game gN|a−T by a−T.
Finally, a ￿nite two-person game of weak strategic complementarities has a pseudo-
potential. Indeed, Dubey et al. (2006) showed that a two-person ￿nite game of weak strate-
gic complementarities, where each action set is one-dimensional, has a pseudo-potential: 14
Proposition 5.5 (Dubey et al, 2006) Let g{1,2} be a two-person ￿nite game with A1,A2 ⊂
R. If g{1,2} has weak strategic complementarities, then it is a pseudo-potential game.
We extend Proposition 5.5 to the case where the action set of one player is multi-
dimensional.
Proposition 5.6 Let g{1,2} be a ￿nite two-person game with A1 ⊂ Rm, where m ∈ N, and
A2 ⊂ R. If g{1,2} has weak strategic complementarities, then it is a pseudo-potential game.
Proof. See Appendix.
We prove Theorem 5.1 by applying Lemmas 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and Proposition 5.6 itera-
tively. The outline of the proof is the following: let gN be a ￿nite game of weak strategic
complementarities. Firstly, by Lemma 5.4 and Proposition 5.6, we know there exists a
partition {{1,2},3,...,n} pseudo-potential of gN. Next, by Lemmas 5.2 and 5.3, in par-
ticular, we can ￿nd a partition {{1,2},3,...,n} pseudo-potential f{{1,2},3,...,n} such that a
best-response of representative agent {1,2} is non-decreasing with a−{1,2}. Then, we can
regard f{{1,2},3,...,n} as a game of weak strategic complementarities. Moreover, by applying
Lemmas 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and Proposition 5.6, we have a partition {{1,2,3},...,n} pseudo-
potential f{{1,2,3},...,n} of f{{1,2},3,...,n} such that f{{1,2},3,...,n} is a game of weak strategic com-
plementarities, and so on. Finally, we can ￿nd a partition {{1,2,...,n}} pseudo-potential
(f{{1,2,...,n}}) of f{{1,2,...,n−1},n}. Thus, we have a nested pseudo-potential f = f{{1,2,...,n}}.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. See Appendix.
14In fact, Dubey et al. (2006) showed that games with an aggregator of weak strategic complementarities
or weak strategic substitutes are pseudo-potential games.
96 Examples
In what follows, we show by way of examples that, when the action set of a single player is
allowed multi-dimensional, the relationship among strategic complementarities, a pseudo
potential and a nested pseudo potential is given as in Figure 1 of Introduction.
As mentioned in Proposition 5.5, Dubey et al. (2006) showed that two-person games of
weak strategic complementarities are pseudo-potential games. However, games with more
than two players of weak strategic complementarities may not be a pseudo-potential game
as the following example shown.
Example 6.1 Consider the three-person game g{1,2,3} in Table 1, where player 1 chooses
the row, player 2 chooses the column, and player 3 chooses the matrix.
0 0 1
0 4,4,4 0,0,1
1 0,1,0 1,0,0
1 0 1
0 1,0,0 0,1,0
1 0,0,1 4,4,4
Table 1: (g1,g2,g3)
We can show that g{1,2,3} has weak strategic complementarities.
However, this game is not a pseudo-potential game. Indeed, note that g{1,2,3} has a
strict best-response cycle (1,0,0) → (1,0,1) → (0,0,1) → (0,1,1) → (0,1,0) → (1,1,0) →
(1,0,0). Since pseudo-potential games cannot have strict best-response cycles as shown by
Kukushkin (2004), this game is not a pseudo-potential game. On the other hand, g{1,2,3}
is a nested pseudo-potential game. Indeed, (f2
{1,2},f1
{3}) given in Table 2 is a {{1,2},{3}}-
pseudo-potential of g{1,2,3}, where f1
{3}(·) = g3(·).
0 1
(0,0) 3,4 1,0
(0,1) 0,1 2,0
(1,0) 2,0 0,1
(1,1) 1,0 3,4
Table 2: (f1
{1,2},f1
{3})
0 1
(0,0) 2 0
(0,1) 1 0
(1,0) 0 1
(1,1) 0 2
Table 3: f2
{1,2,3} or f
Regarding the {{1,2},{3}}-pseudo-potential (f2
{1,2},f1
{3}) as a strategic form game, we can
show that (f2
{1,2,3}) de￿ned in Table 3 is a {{1,2,3}}-pseudo-potential of (f2
{1,2},f1
{3}). Thus
g{1,2,3} is a nested pseudo-potential game.
10A pseudo-potential game may not have strategic complementarities as in the following
example.
Example 6.2 Consider the three-person game g{1,2,3} in Table 5, where player 1 chooses
the row, player 2 chooses the column, and player 3 chooses the matrix.
0 0 1 2
0 0,0,0 1,1,0 0,0,1
1 0,0,0 0,0,1 1,1,0
1 0 1 2
0 1,1,1 1,0,1 0,0,0
1 1,0,1 0,0,0 1,0,1
Table 4: g{1,2,3} is a pseudo-potential without weak strategic complementarities
We can show that g{1,2,3} has a pseudo-potential f in Table 5. We can also show that
g{1,2,3} does not have weak strategic complementarities.
0 0 1 2
0 0 2 1
1 0 1 2
1 0 1 2
0 4 3 0
1 1 0 3
Table 5: a pseudo-potential f of g{1,2,3}
The following game, which appeared in Uno (2007a), strategic complementarities or a
pseudo-potential game but it is a nested pseudo-potential game.
Example 6.3 (Uno, 2007a) Consider the three-person game g{1,2,3} in Table 6, where
player 1 chooses the row, player 2 chooses the column, and player 3 chooses the matrix;
players 1 and 2 have identical interests, player 3’s payo￿ is the same as others when player
1 chooses a1, but is reversed otherwise as in the matching pennies game.
0 0 1
0 3,3,3 0,0,0
1 −1,−1,1 1,1,−1
1 0 1
0 0,0,0 2,2,2
1 1,1,−1 −1,−1,1
Table 6: (g1,g2,g3)
Note that g{1,2,3} is not a game of strategic complementarities. Note also that g{1,2,3}
is not a pseudo-potential game. Indeed, g{1,2,3} has a strict best-response cycle (1,0,0) →
(1,1,0) → (1,1,1) → (1,0,1) → (1,0,0). Since pseudo-potential games cannot have strict
best response cycles as shown by Kukushkin (2004), the game is not a pseudo-potential
game. However, we can show that g{1,2,3} is a nested pseudo-potential game.
11Remark 6.4 Dubey et al. (2006) presented a more general version of Proposition 5.5
where action sets are compact subsets of R, provided that, for each player i, i’s best-
response selection bi is continuous in the set A−i of the other players’ action pro￿les as
well. But, we cannot immediately extend Theorem 5.1 to games with compact action sets.
This is because it is di￿cult to guarantee that there exists a partition potential f{{1,2},3,...,n}
of a game gN such that a best-response selection b{1,2} of representative agent {1,2} is
continuous in the set A−{1,2} of action pro￿les of players outside {1,2}, since a game of weak
strategic complementarities does not always have a continuous non-decreasing equilibrium
selection.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 5.2. Suppose that gN is a game of weak strategic complementarities.
For each i ∈ N, let bi : A−i → Ai be i’s best-response selection such that bi(a−i) ≤ bi(a′
−i)
whenever a−i < a′
−i. Fix any T ⊆ N. For any a−T ∈ A−T, let bT(·,a−T) : AT → AT
be the function de￿ned by bT(aT,a−T) := (bi(aT\{i},a−T))i∈T for any aT ∈ AT. For any
a−T ∈ A−T, since bT(·,a−T) is a non-decreasing function, by Tarski’s ￿xed point theorem
(Theorem 2.1), there exists the greatest (least) ￿xed point of bT(·,a−T), i.e., the greatest
(least) pure strategy Nash equilibrium of gN|a−T.
Pick any a−T,a′
−T ∈ A−T with a−T < a′
−T. Let eT(a−T) and eT(a′
−T) be the great-
est pure strategy Nash equilibria of gN|a−T and gN|a′
−T, respectively. Because eT(a−T) =
bT(eT(a−T),a−T) and bT(eT(a−T),a−T) ≤ bT(eT(a−T),a′
−T), we have eT(a−T) ≤ bT(eT(a−T),
a′
−T). By Theorem 2.1, sup{aT ∈ AT|aT ≤ bT(aT,a′
−T)} is the greatest pure strategy Nash
equilibrium of gN|a′
−T. Thus, we have eT(a−T) ≤ eT(a′
−T).
Proof of Lemma 5.3. Suppose that gN is a game with pseudo-potential f. Let a∗ be a
pure strategy Nash equilibrium of gN. Let c ∈ R be a su￿ciently large number such that
c > maxa∈A f(a). De￿ne a function ˆ f : A → R such that, for each a ∈ A,
ˆ f(a) =
{
c if a = a∗
f(a) otherwise
Then, we have {a∗} = argmaxa∈A ˆ f(a). And, we can show that ˆ f is also a pseudo-
potential of gN. Indeed, ￿x any i ∈ N and any a−i ∈ A−i. If a−i ̸= a∗
−i, we have
argmaxai∈Ai ˆ f(ai,a−i) = argmaxai∈Ai f(ai,a−i). Since f is a pseudo-potential of gN,
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−i, we have {a∗
i} = argmaxai∈Ai
ˆ f(ai,a−i). Since a∗ is a Nash equilibrium, we have a∗
i ∈ argmaxai∈Ai gi(ai,a−i). Thus we
have argmaxai∈Ai ˆ f(ai,a−i) ⊆ argmaxai∈Ai gi(ai,a−i). Hence ˆ f is a pseudo-potential of gN.
Proof of Proposition 5.6. Suppose that g{1,2} has weak strategic complementarities.
Then, for i,j = 1,2 with i ̸= j, there exists a function bi : Aj → Ai such that bi(aj) ∈
argmaxai∈Ai gi(ai,aj) for all aj ∈ Aj, and bi(aj) ≤ bi(a′
j) whenever aj < a′
j. Let A′
1 be the
range of b1, i.e., A′
1 := {a1 ∈ A1| there exists a2 ∈ A2 such that a1 = b1(a2)}. Since A′
1 is
linearly ordered and ￿nite, there exist a subset A1 of R and a bijection h from A′
1 to A1
such that for each a1,a′
1 ∈ A′
1, a1 < a′
1 if and only if h(a1) < h(a′
1). Such ˆ A1 exists by the
property of b1. Let ˆ g1 : ˆ A1×A2 → R be the function de￿ned by ˆ g1(ˆ a1,a2) = g1(h−1(ˆ a1),a2)
for all ˆ a1 ∈ ˆ A1 and all a2 ∈ A2.
Consider a two-person game (ˆ g1,g2) given by (ˆ g1,g2) := ({1,2},( ˆ A1,A2),(ˆ g1,g2)). It
then follows that there exists player 1’s best-response selection ˆ b1 : A2 → ˆ A1 such that
ˆ b1(a2) ≤ ˆ b1(a′
2) whenever a2 < a′
2, since A′
1 and ˆ A1 are order isomorphic, b1(a2) ∈ A′
1 for any
a2 ∈ A2, and b1(a2) ≤ b1(a′
2) whenever a2 < a′
2. Since g{1,2} has strategic complementarities,
there exists also player 2’s best-response selection ˆ b2 : ˆ A1 → A2 such that ˆ b2(a1) ≤ ˆ b2(a′
1)
whenever a1 < a′
1. Thus, (ˆ g1,g2) has weak strategic complementarities. By proposition 5.5,
(ˆ g1,g2) has a pseudo-potential ˆ f : ˆ A1 × A2 → R.
Let c ∈ R be su￿ciently small so that c < min(ˆ a1,a2)∈ ˆ A1×A2
ˆ f(ˆ a1,a2), which exists since
ˆ A1 × A2 is ￿nite.
Let f : A → R be a function such that, for all a1 ∈ A1 and all a2 ∈ A2,
f(a1,a2) =

 
 
ˆ f(h(a1),a2) if a1 ∈ A′
1
c if a1 ∈ A1\A′
1 and a2 ∈ b2(a1)
c − 1 otherwise
(2)
We will show that f is a pseudo-potential of g{1,2}. Fix any a2 ∈ A2. Pick any a∗∗
1 ∈
argmaxa1∈A1 f(a1,a2). Then, a∗∗
1 ∈ A′
1 must hold by the choice of constant c in the con-
struction of f. Since a∗∗
1 ∈ argmaxa1∈A′
1 f(a1,a2), we have h(a∗∗
1 ) ∈ argmaxˆ a1∈ ˆ A1
ˆ f(ˆ a1,a2).
Since ˆ f is a pseudo-potential of (ˆ g1,g2), we have h(a∗∗
1 ) ∈ argmaxˆ a1∈ ˆ A1 ˆ g1(ˆ a1,a2). Since A′
1
and ˆ A1 are order isomorphic, we have a∗∗
1 ∈ argmaxa1∈A′
1 g1(a1,a2). And, since a∗∗
1 ∈ A′
1, we
have g1(a∗∗
1 ,a2) ≥ g1(a1,a2) for all a1 ∈ A1\A′
1. Thus, we have a∗∗
1 ∈ argmaxa1∈A1 g1(a1,a2).
Fix any a1 ∈ A1. Pick any a∗∗
2 ∈ argmaxa2∈A2 f(a1,a2). If a1 ∈ A′
1, we have a∗∗
2 ∈
13argmaxa2∈A2 g2(a1,a2), since ˆ f is a pseudo-potential of (ˆ g1,g2). If a1 ∈ A1\A′
1, we must
have a∗∗
2 ∈ b2(a1) by the construction of f. Thus, we have a∗∗
2 ∈ argmaxa2∈A2 g2(a1,a2).
Hence, f is a pseudo-potential of g{1,2}.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Without loss of generality, we will assume that m1 ∈ N and
mi = 1 for each i ̸= 1. Suppose that gN is a game of weak strategic complementarities. We
shall show that, for each l = 1,2,...,n, there exists a function fl
{1,...,l} : A → R such that
1. (fl
{1,...,l},gl+1,...,gn) is a {{1,...,l},{l + 1},...,{n}}-pseudo-potential of
(f
l−1
{1,...,l−1},gl,...,gn), where (f0
{0},g1,...,gn) := (g1,...,gn);
2. there exists a function b{1,...,l} : A−{1,...,l} → A{1,...,l} with
• b{1,...,l}(a−{1,...,l}) ∈ arg max
a{1,...,l}∈A{1,...,l}
f
l
{1,...,l}(a{1,...,l},a−{1,...,l}) for all a−{1,...,l} ∈
A−{1,...,l}, and
• b{1,...,l}(a−{1,...,l}) ≥ b{1,...,l}(a′
−{1,...,l}) whenever a−{1,...,l} > a′
−{1,...,l}.
The proof proceeds by induction on l. First, when l = 1, let f1
{1}(·) := g1(·). Then,
(f1
{1},...,gn) is a {{1},...,{n}}-potential of (g1,...,gn). Moreover, since gN is a game
of weak strategic complementarities, there exists a function b{1} : A−{1} → A{1} with
b{1}(a−{1}) ∈ arg max
a{1}∈A{1}
f
1
{1}(a{1},a−{1}) for all a−{1} ∈ A−{1}, and b{1}(a−{1}) ≥ b{1}(a′
−{1})
whenever a−{1} > a′
−{1}.
Suppose that, for each l ≤ k − 1 ≤ n − 1, there exist functions fl
{1,...,l} : A → R and
b{1,...,l} : A−{1,...,l} → A{1,...,l} such that the conditions 1 and 2 hold. We will show that there
exists such functions fk
{1,...,k} : A → R and b{1,...,k} : A−{1,...,k} → A{1,...,k}.
Fix any a−{1,...,k} ∈ A−{1,...,k}. Consider a restricted game (f
k−1
{1,...,k−1},gk,...,gn)|a−{1,...,k}
by a−{1,...,k}. By the assumption of induction, there exists a function b{1,...,k−1}(·,a−{1,...,k}) :
Ak → A{1,...,k−1} with b{1,...,k−1}(ak,a−{1,...,k}) ∈ arg max
a{1,...,k−1}∈A{1,...,k−1}
f
k−1
{1,...,k−1}(a{1,...,k−1},ak,
a−{1,...,k}) for all ak ∈ Ak, and b{1,...,k−1}(ak,a−{1,...,k}) ≥ b{1,...,k−1}(a′
k,a−{1,...,k}) whenever
ak > a′
k. And, since bk is player k’s best-response selection such that bk(a{1,...,k−1},a−{1,...,k}) ≥
bk(a′
{1,...,k−1},a−{1,...,k}) whenever a{1,...,k−1} > a′
1,...,k−1, we can regard the restricted game
(f
k−1
{1,...,k−1},gk,...,gn)|a−{1,...,k} by a−{1,...,k} as a two-person game of weak strategic com-
plementarities, where N = {{1,...,k − 1},{k}}, A{1,...,k} ⊂ Rm+k−1, and Ak ⊂ R. By
Proposition 5.6, (f
k−1
{1,...,k−1},gk,gk+1,...,gn)|a−{1,...,k} has a pseudo-potential.
Now, consider a restricted game gN|a−{1,...,k} for any a−{1,...,k} ∈ A−{1,...,k}. Since gN
has weak strategic complementarities, by Lemma 5.2, there exists an equilibrium selection
14e{1,...,k} : A−{1,...,k} → A{1,...,k} of gN|a−{1,...,k} such that e{1,...,k}(a−{1,...,k}) ≤ e{1,...,k}(a′
−{1,...,k})
whenever a−{1,...,k} < a′
−{1,...,k}.
For any a−{1,...,k} ∈ A−{1,...,k}, since (f
k−1
{1,...,k−1},gk,...,gn)|a−{1,...,k} has a pseudo-potential,
by Lemma 5.3, there exists a pseudo-potential fk
{1,...,k}(·,a−{1,...,k}) : A{1,...,k} → R such that
e{1,...,k}(a−{1,...,k}) is a unique maximizer of fk
{1,...,k}:
{e{1,...,k}(a−{1,...,k})} = arg max
a{1,...,k}∈A{1,...,k}
f
k
{1,...,k}(a{1,...,k},a−{1,...,k}). (3)
Recall that, for any partition T of N, gN has a partition T pseudo-potential if and
only if, for each member T of T , for any a−T ∈ A−T, the restricted game gN|a−T by
a−T is a pseudo-potential game (De￿nition 4.1). For any partition T of N, recall that
(fT)T∈T is a partition T pseudo-potential of gN if and only if, for each member T of
T , for any a−T ∈ A−T, fT(·,a−T) is a pseudo-potential of the restricted game gN|a−T by
a−T. Thus, (fk
{1,...,k},gk+1,...,gn) is a {{1,...,k},{k + 1},...,{n}}-pseudo-potential of
(f
k−1
{1,...,k−1},gk,gk+1,...,gn). Hence, fk
{1,...,k} satis￿es Condition 1.
Let b{1,...,k} : A−{1,...,k} → A{1,...,k} be the function de￿ned by b{1,...,k}(a−{1,...,k}) :=
e{1,...,k}(a−{1,...,k}) for any a−{1,...,k} ∈ A−{1,...,k}. Then, b{1,...,k} satis￿es Condition 2, since
(3) holds and eT(a−{1,...,k}) is non-decreasing with a−{1,...,k}. Thus, gN is a nested pseudo-
potential game.
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